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INTRODUCTION
Amici curiae UHA, Utah Hospitals and Health Systems Association ("UHA") and
Utah Medical Association ("UMA") represent the major institutional and individual
health care providers in the State of Utah. UHA is a trade association of 48 acute and
specialty hospitals and 11 health systems operating in Utah. UMA represents some 3,100
individual members, including physicians, medical students, and non-physician affiliates
throughout Utah. These Health Care Amici are keenly aware of the legal, ethical, and
practical dimensions of patient confidentiality within (and outside of) the context of
litigation and welcome the opportunity to provide their perspective of the issues before
the Court. These issues are of great importance to our patients, our industry, and our
system of state government. In addition, the parties to this appeal have consented to the
submission of this brief and to a forthcoming brief of the Utah Trial Lawyers'
Association. See Addendum A.
The central issue in this case is whether the plain language of Rule 506 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence governs the disclosure of patient information in litigation or not. We
believe that it does and that the Court of Appeals erred in not only failing to apply Rule
506 as written but also in making actionable as "tortious" and "outrageous conduct"
communications (1) permitted by Rule 506 and Utah Code. Ann. § 78-24-8 and (2)
considered to be entirely appropriate and beneficial when directed to plaintiffs counsel.
We strongly urge the Court to reverse the Court of Appeals' departure from Rule
506 and its creation of one-sided tort liability.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
This Court identified the following issues in its Order granting the Petitioner's
Writ of Certiorari:
(1) Whether by filing a personal injury suit Respondent waived any duty of
confidentiality encompassing ex parte communications between Petitioner and the
defendant in that suit.
(2) Whether the court of appeals erred in construing the scope of the privilege set
forth in Rule 506 of the Rules of Evidence and/or the scope of the exception to the
privilege set forth in subpart (d)(1).
In response, the Health Care Amici respectfully submit that:
(1) By filing a personal injury lawsuit, the physician-patient privilege no longer
existed and Petitioner could disclose patient information in the context of the litigation;
and
(2) The Court of Appeals erred in construing the scope of the litigation exception
in Rule 506 by imposing an additional requirement-in the form of a fiduciary duty of
confidentiality- that does not appear in the Rule's text.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeal's ruling in this case not only impacts the parties to this
action, the physicians of this state, and tort litigants in general, but it also impinges upon
this Court's rulemaking powers.
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This case is not about patient confidentiality in general. It is about patient
confidentiality in the context of litigation, the application of Rule 506 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence, and the Court of Appeals' departure from the Rule's plain language.
Rule 506 governs patient information in litigation. It establishes both the
physician-patient privilege and the litigation exception to that privilege. Under the
litigation exception, no privilege exists as to any communication that is relevant to a
patient's condition that is at issue in a legal proceeding. This language is clear, and the
Court of Appeals should have applied it as written.
Instead, the Court of Appeals circumvented Rule 506 and imposed a "fiduciary
duty of confidentiality." Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2006 UT 340, \\6. This court-made duty
not only created a substantive right of prior notice to a patient before disclosure, but it
also included the unconditional statement that "ex parte communication between a
physician and opposing counsel constitutes a breach o f this duty. Id. at ^[15. The effect
of this ruling is to (1) rewrite a Rule of Evidence that comes solely within the authority
of this Court to amend and (2) make actionable that which is permitted under Rule 506.
Rule 506 is the result of a deliberative process by the appropriate branch of state
government and is also reasonable in its scope and application. First, Rule 506 strikes a
reasonable balance between patient information that is not privileged because it is at issue
in a lawsuit and all other patient information for which the privilege remains. Second,
even if a communication is not privileged under the litigation exception, a physician
retains the discretion to maintain silence and not disclose patient information unless
subpoenaed or court-ordered otherwise. Third, there is no restriction on the ability of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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party to seek a court order to either specifically restrict or expressly authorize ex parte
communications as circumstances may warrant.
But regardless of its merits, the proper time and place and method for amending
Rule 506 is through this Court's formal rulemaking process and not by judicial
interpretation. Rule 501, the umbrella Rule for privileges, abolishes all common law
privileges and limits the creation of privileges to Court Rule and existing statute. As
such, Rule 501 unequivocally stands for the proposition that an amendment to Rule 506
is to be made through the Court's formal rulemaking process and not, as the Court of
Appeals did here, through a common law pronouncement.
Lastly, there are serious and problematic ramifications of the Court of Appeals
decision if permitted to stand. The first is the inappropriate and potentially harmful effect
of recasting the physician-patient relationship as one that goes beyond the recognized
duty to diagnose and treat to include the notion that a physician is legally obligated to
side with and advocate for a patient in matters of litigation. When it comes to litigation,
the role of a physician should be limited to that of a party or that of a witness with the
same rules and expectations of truthfulness, accuracy, and objectivity applied to them as
anyone else.
The second is the uneven playing field that the Court sanctions and protects by
making it tortious for one party in a lawsuit to do what another party does as a matter of
course. It is our view that there are good and valid reasons to permit plaintiffs counsel to
engage in informal discovery, including ex parte interviews with potential witnesses, to
decrease costs and fully and expeditiously uncover the truth. These reasons, however, are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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equally applicable to defense counsel, and it would be patently unjust to not recognize
that fact.
For these reasons, the Court should reverse the Court of Appeals decision and
apply Rule 506 as written.
ARGUMENT
I. RULE 506 GOVERNS PATIENT INFORMATION IN LIGATION AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RESTRICTING AND MAKING
ACTIONABLE COMMUNICATIONS THAT RULE 506 PERMITS
This case is about patient confidentiality in the context of litigation, the application
of Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and the Court of Appeals departure from the
Rule's plain language. It is not about patient confidentiality in general.
A. WHEN A PATIENT'S CONDITION IS AT ISSUE IN A LEGAL
PROCEEDING, NO PRIVILEGE EXISTS
Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence governs the physician-patient privilege
and the litigation exception. See Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, 133 P.3d 370. The
physician-patient privilege extends broad protection to patient information communicated
confidentially by a patient to a physician in the course of diagnosis and treatment. Rule
506(b) provides:
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence
and for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the patient, a patient has a privilege,
during the patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician
or mental health therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the patient,
and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a physician or mental health
therapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the
direction of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians or
members of the patient's family who are present to further the interest of the
patient because they are reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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communications, or participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction
of the physician or mental health therapist.
The purpose of the physician-patient privilege is "to promote full disclosure within a
physician-patient relationship and thereby facilitate more effective treatment/' and to
"alleviate patients' fear that their medical records could be disclosed to the public and
cause embarrassment." Id. at \ 11.
The physician-privilege is not absolute. Rule 506 includes three specific
exceptions. See Rule 506(d), Utah R. Evid. These exceptions do not constitute a waiver
of the privilege. Instead, when these exceptions apply, no privilege exists. See Utah R.
Evid. 506 Advisory Committee Notes. One such exception is the litigation exception in
Rule 506(d)(1), which states:
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(d)(1) Condition as an element of a claim or defense. As to a communication
relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in
any proceeding in which that condition is an element of any claim or defense, or,
after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the
condition as an element of the claim or defense.
The effect of this language is to unequivocally remove legal protection from a
communication that is relevant to a patient's condition when it becomes the subject of a
legal proceeding, provided that the limitations included in Rule 506(d)(1) are followed.
First, the removal of the privilege only pertains to a communication that is relevant
to a condition at issue in the legal proceeding. The privilege would continue to apply
with full force and effect to any other patient communication that falls outside of the
proceeding. Second, there must be a legal proceeding. While this normally will consist
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of the filing of a complaint in a civil action, it may take other forms such as the initiation
of a criminal investigation. Id. at ^13.
In pointing out the explicit limitations in the litigation exception, it is equally
important to clarify what Rule 506 does not say. First, there is nothing in Rule 506 that
compels a treating physician to verbally disclose patient information to any party in a
lawsuit unless compelled to do so by a subpoena or court order. It merely makes such
disclosures permissible by removing the physician-patient privilege. This is as true for a
plaintiff as it is for a defendant.
Lastly, there is nothing in Rule 506 that would limit the ability of a party to seek a
court order to either expressly authorize or expressly restrict ex parte communications
between a treating physician and a party to the legal proceeding. See Rule 26, Utah R.
Civ. P. (outlining the purpose, scope, and limitations of discovery, including a protective
order under Rule 26(c)).
B. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING PATIENT
INFORMATION IN LITIGATION IS FOUND IN STATUTE AND
NOT THE COMMON LAW
As authority for the proposition that a fiduciary duty of confidentiality existed
outside of Rule 506, the Court of Appeals cited Debry in which it is extended to a patient
"the right to be notified of the potential disclosure of confidential [information]... even if.
the communications may fall into [the exception] to the privilege." Sorensen v. Barbuto,
2006 UT App 340, % 15 quoting Debry at ^ 28. The Court reasoned that this duty of
confidentiality for a physician "transcends any duty he has as a citizen to voluntarily
provide information that might be relevant in pending litigation."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
7 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Court's decision to superimpose a duty of confidentiality on Rule 506 is not
only at odds with this Court's rule making authority and the plain language of Rule 506,
but it is also inconsistent with the common law. At common law,
a physician called to testify as a witness was competent to disclose any
information required by, or communicated to, him in the course of his attendance
upon, or treatment of his patient in a professional capacity, nor could the physician
refuse to give, nor the patient by objection exclude, such testimony.
State v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 272-73, 254 P. 142, 143 (Utah 1927). Consequently, it
would be incorrect to attribute Utah's historical protection of patient information in
litigation to the common law. Instead, the roots of such protection are in the statutorily
created physician-patient privilege. See Anderson, 972 P.2d at 88 ("The physicianpatient privilege never existed at common law."); Burns at ^f 10 ("The physician-patient
privilege was not recognized at common law but has been adopted in Utah, first by
statute and subsequently by rule.")
The physician-patient privilege was statutorily enacted as a purposeful
modification of the common law. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah App. 1989).
The privilege is now governed by Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence under the
Court's "primary constitutional authority to promulgate procedural and evidentiary rules
subject to the possibility of amendment by two-thirds absolute majority vote of the
Legislature." Burns at \\ 1. It has also been judicially recognized as both the expression
of "the policy of the law to encourage confidence" of patient information, and the basis of
a cause of action "for any injury suffered." Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah
1958).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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But even if one were to assume that the basis of the Court of Appeals' ruling to
superimpose a duty could be found in some broader common law concept of negligence
or privacy, any such application of the common law would be preempted by the language
and effect of Rule 501.
C. RULE 501 BLANKETS THE FIELD OF PRIVILEGES AND
PREEMPTS EXISTING AND DEVELOPING COMMON LAW
Rule 501 of the Utah Rules of Evidence serves as a substantive introduction to the
Court's Rules on privileges and speaks to the limited method of their creation. Rule 501
states:
Except as provided in the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Utah,
no person shall have a privilege to withhold evidence except as provided by these
or other rules adopted by the Utah Supreme Court or by existing statutory
provisions not in conflict with them.
Two things stand out from this language. First, by stating that "no person shall
have a privilege to withhold evidence," the Rule, in effect, cleans the slate and starts from
the proposition that no privileges exists. This is a critical point in the present case
because it represents a clear intent to abolish any common law privileges that may
otherwise serve as a barrier to a physician disclosing patient information in context of
litigation if permitted under Rule 506.
Second, by stating that the only way to create exceptions to the general rule of "no
privilege" is by Court Rule and existing statute, the Rule, in effect, underscores the
principle that privileges—because "they interfere with the establishment of the whole
truth"—should not be the product of judicial pronouncement but by formal rulemaking or
the legislative process. See Utah R. Evid. 501 Advisory Committee Note.
9
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Together, these two points abolish common law privileges and preempt future
judicial attempts to create the same. The comments of the Advisory Committee support
this conclusion to a significant extent, although there is a noticeable reluctance on the
part of the committee to completely foreclose the Court's authority to "create and shape
privileges by its decisions in concrete cases." Id. Still, the comments go on to boldly
state that the "language of 501, that there are no non-rule, non-statutory privileges, serves
as a declaration by the Court that it intends to operate normally through formal rulemaking procedures." Id.
The reluctance expressed by the Committee is understandable and not altogether
unwise under the circumstances. However, the plain language of Rule 501 is quite clear
and serves as a definitive statement of intent to preempt the application of the common
law in matters of privilege, a fact that generally reduces, if not eliminates, the Court's
need to look beyond the text of an enactment in determining its meaning. See Summit
Water Distr. Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, \\1 ("It is well settled in this court that
our goal when interpreting a statute 'is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced
by the [statute's] plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'
Foutz v. City ofS Jordan, 2004 UT 75, *{ 11, 100 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation omitted).
When evaluating the plain language of a particular statutory provision, we interpret it 'in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters.' Mountain Ranch
Estates v. Utah State Tax Comm % 2004 UT 86, ^ 11, 100 P.3d 1206 (internal quotation
omitted). However, '[i]f we find ambiguity in the statute's language, we look to
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

legislative history and other policy considerations for guidance.' Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Utah State Tax Comm % 2003 UT 53,1f 14, 86 P.3d 706.")
The idea of a statute or ordinance preempting the common law is neither new nor
uncommon. In fact,
[t]he rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the
laws of the state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions
and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95, t 7, citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (Court
held that statute preempted common law claims for employment discrimination in
companies with fewer than 15 employees). Consequently, "where a conflict arises
between the common law and a statute or constitutional law, the common law must
yield," because "the common law cannot be an authority in opposition to our positive
enactments." Id.
In determining whether "legislation is intended to blanket a particular field and
thereby preempt existing or developing common law," a court may look to the express
preemptive language of a statute or it may find a pervasiveness to a statute's structure and
purpose, an irreconcilable conflict between a statute and the common law which makes
compliance with both a physical impossibility, or the common law as an obstacle to the
full purpose and objectives of the legislature. Id. at f 8.
Here that same analysis can and should be applied to privileges found in Court
Rule and the Court should apply Rule 501 as written to abolish and preempt existing and
developing common law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Finally, on a related point, it should be noted that Rule 501 is not the only body of
law to consider on the issue of common law preemption. Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8
previously governed the physician-patient privilege and the litigation exception, and parts
of Section 78-24-8 may continue to be in effect pursuant to Rule 501 as an existing
statutory enactment. That state statute preempted the common law can be drawn from
the fact that it was necessary for a state statute to modify the common law to give patient
information protection in the first place. State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d at 88. To now hold
that the common law has not only gained a foothold in the statutory-based law of
privileges, but that it has caught up to and surpassed the protection created in statute (and
now governed by Court rule) would be a significant analytical stretch.
D. RULE 506 IS SUBJECT TO STRICT CONSTRUCTION AND
SHOULD BE APPLIED AS WRITTEN
Rule 506 is the result of a deliberative process by a branch of state government
with the primary constitutional authority to establish and amend its contours. Like the
rest of Rule 506, it is carefully crafted to strike a reasonable balance between what should
be privileged and what should not. As such an enactment, Rule 506 should be subject to
the general and universal rules of construction that apply to statutes and ordinances,
including the requirement that it be construed in accordance with its plain language, LKL
Assocs.f Inc. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, U 7, 94 P.3d 279 {citing Dick Simon Trucking v.
Utah State Tax Comm % 2004 UT 11, If 17, 84 P.3d 1197), the assumption that "each
term . . . was used advisedly; thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a
reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable.'" R.A. McKellExcavating, Inc. v. Wells
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Fargo Bank N.A., 2004 UT 48, ^ 8, 100 P.3d 1159 (quoting Johnson v. Redevelopment
Agency, 913 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1995)), and a recognition of the distinct and significant
difference between the role of the Court in interpreting language when functioning in a
judicial capacity and drafting language when functioning in a rulemaking capacity. See
University of Utah v. Shurtleff, 2006 UT 51,^51 ("No matter how persuasive we may
find such [policy] arguments, we are constrained by our judicial role. Our role is one of
interpreting, not drafting.")
That Rule 506 is to be strictly construed is amply demonstrated in Burns. In
Burns, the State Department of Insurance sought to compel the production of patient
records from a physician under investigation for insurance fraud, arguing that Utah Code
Section § 31A-31-104(1) (b) impliedly trumped the physician-patient privilege by
requiring insurers to release information or evidence of suspected insurance fraud to an
authorized agency. The Court, however, refused to create such an exception, stating:
The text of the statute [] does not impose any direct duty on a physician to release
privileged information, and we decline to insert such a substantive requirement by
judicial fiat. See Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys.f Inc., 2001 UT 29, ^f 12, 24
P.3d 928 (refusing to infer "substantive terms" into the text of a statute if they are
"not already there")."
Burns at Tf 16.
The State then proceeded to argue that the physician-patient exception should be
construed narrowly to create an exception for investigations into suspected insurance
fraud. While the Court agreed that rule 506 should be "strictly construed and applied,"
since the effect of a privilege is to "close another window to the light of truth," citing

13
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State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 1979), it disagreed that such strict
construction could yield the state's desired insurance fraud exception. Id. at ^ 17.
Instead, the Court's strict construction of Rule 506 resulted in an affirmation that
there are only three explicit exceptions to the Rule and that the creation of an exception
for suspected insurance fraud would be "inconsistent with the intended effect of the rule."
Id. at f 18. In the same way that the Court applied strict construction in interpreting Rule
506 in finding that there was no valid basis for recognizing an exception to the physicianpatient privilege for insurance fraud, the Court should likewise apply strict construction
here and refrain from substantively modifying the litigation exception by inserting text
that is not present.
E. PRIVILEGES SHOULD BE MODIFIED THROUGH THE
FORMAL RULEMAKING PROCESS TO ENSURE
PROSPECTIVE OPERATION AND THE OPPORTUNITY FOR
PUBLIC COMMENT
In addition to the points above, there are two other reasons for the Court to modify
privileges through the formal rulemaking process rather than by judicial interpretation or
the extension of the common law. The first involves the issue of prospective versus
retrospective operation, and the second is related to the significance of the Court's
constitutional authority over matters of privilege.
When legislation is enacted, there is a strong presumption that it will operate
prospectively only. Two things are required to overcome this presumption. First, a clear
legislative intent for retrospective operation and, second, a determination that the "statute
changes only procedural law by providing a different mode or form of procedure for
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enforcing substantive rights" without enlarging or eliminating vested rights. Roarkv.
Crabtree, 893 P.2d 1058, 1062 (Utah 1995) {quotingPilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455
(Utah 1983).
In contrast, "[t]he general rule from time Immemorial" is that a "ruling of a court
is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and prospectively" and
that "whether the general rule should be departed from depends on whether a substantial
injustice would otherwise occur." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984)
(petition for reh'g). As such, a judicial ruling that recognizes, interprets, or construes a
common law duty will almost always operate prospectively and retrospectively, as
demonstrated by the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, even if the ruling effectuates
a substantial change in the law.
This contrast between a statutory change that only applies prospectively and a
judicial ruling that applies both prospectively and retrospectively is real and significant.
It is the difference between an enactment of potential liability for future acts and a ruling
of immediate liability for past acts. It is the difference between actual notice of
applicable legal standards and notice of significantly less.
As a matter of judicial restraint and given the preemptive language in Rule 501,
we believe that the Court should limit itself to the formal rulemaking process to ensure
the prospective operation of substantive changes and to avoid a significant restructuring
of the existing framework for how legislative enactments and judicial rulings operate as
currently reflected in Roark and Malan.
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Lastly, using the formal rulemaking process to effectuate substantive changes
would also ensure, at some level, the opportunity for the public to offer comment,
testimony, and input to the Court before such changes would be finalized and adopted.
One could certainly argue that the importance of this process within the judicial branch to
receive public comment should only increase with the constitutional reduction of the
Legislature's authority over such matters. It is also not too far fetched for one to argue
that in matters of privilege, the Court should exercise restraint and only add substantive
terms to Court rules through the formal rulemaking process in the same way that it would
refuse to add substantive text to a statute. In both cases, those who petition the Court to
write something into a statute or rule that cannot be found in its existing text should be
reminded to seek policy changes in the appropriate forum and through the applicable
legislative or judicial rulemaking process. This is, in essence, what the Court did in Burns
when it refused to amend Rule 506 by virtue of a statute that did not expressly pierce the
physician-patient privilege. That analysis should remain true here even when the basis
for the change is not a nondescript statute but a common law pronouncement.
F. COMMUNICATIONS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS SHOULD
NOT BE ACTIONABLE
While not identified by the Court as an issue for appeal, we believe that a final
reason for applying Rule 506 as written is the fact the statements at issue here occurred
within the context of litigation and should be considered in light of the judicial
proceedings privilege, which also strikes a reasonable balance in "promoting] the
integrity of the adjudicatory proceeding and its truth finding processes" by facilitating the
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"free and open expression by all participants" which "will only occur if they are not
inhibited by the risk of subsequent defamation" or related tortuous claims. Debry v.
Godbe, 1999 UT 1115H10.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD EXPRESSLY REJECT THE POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS' HOLDING

We have serious concerns regarding the policy implications of the Court of
Appeals' holding that an "ex parte communication between a physician and opposing
counsel constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality," Sorensen at ^f 16
(emphasis added), and finding that such a communication may also serve as the basis of a
tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ^f 21. These concerns are
three-fold. First, the holding is seemingly stated so broadly as to foreclose all situations
in which a physician may communicate with opposing counsel outside of the presence of
plaintiffs counsel. Second, the holding only applies to "opposing counsel," suggesting
that a physician may have a duty of partisanship in a lawsuit to which he is not a party.
Third, the holding ignores the practical reality of formal discovery in litigation.
A. EX PARTE INTERVIEWS ARE NOT INHERENTLY EVIL
With the filing of a lawsuit, attorneys for both sides seek to expeditiously gather
and weigh as much relevant information as possible in assessing the relative strengths
and weaknesses of their respective positions. It is not uncommon for attorneys to seek
this information through a variety of formal and informal means of discovery, including
ex parte interviews. Among other things, ex parte interviews provide a cost-effective
way of identifying essential and non-essential witnesses, quickly and efficiently gathering

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17

initial and follow up information, and minimizing the intrusiveness of litigation on
potential witnesses to the extent possible and where appropriate.
In 1999, The Utah State Bar Ethics Committee reviewed the ethical implications
of opposing counsel engaging in ex parte contact with a treating physician and concluded
that (1) "[t]here is no ethical rule that prohibits ex parte contact with plaintiffs treating
physician when plaintiffs physical condition is at issue" and (2) "[t]he mere possibility
of misconduct by an attorney during an ex parte contact with a physician does not justify
a blanket prohibition on such ex parte contacts." Utah Bar Ethics Op. 99-03. The
Committee, appropriately, limited its analysis to the ethical implications of ex parte
contacts by lawyers and refrained from offering a legal opinion on the potential
application or scope of the physician-patient privilege. Id.
Like the Ethics Committee, we recognize that an analysis of legal ethics does not
directly answer the legal issues posed in this case. But we do think that the perspective of
the Committee in recognizing the utility and efficiency of ex parte contacts in informal
discovery is noteworthy. Also noteworthy is the recognized use and general acceptance
of ex parte contacts by the plaintiffs' bar in the very manner that the Court of Appeals
ruled would be tortuous if done by defense counsel.
On these points, we firmly believe that within the appropriate limits of the law,
litigation needs to cost less—not more. It is not uncommon for a patient to be treated by
dozens of physicians over a relevant period of time. Limiting a defense attorney to
formal means of discovery would do nothing but drive up costs and create additional
delay. More important, is the uneven playing field that such a one-sided prohibition
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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creates. Without the ability to interview physicians ex parte, defense counsel would
always be required to expend funds to take a deposition to determine whether a physician
may be in possession of relevant facts or opinions, a cost not applicable to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs, moreover, would have open and regular access to a witness, including crucial
times just before depositions and trial, while defendant would be limited to a single uon
the record" inquiry. Through this access, plaintiffs could seek and obtain advisory
opinions from a witness both before and after a deposition and could offer literature,
expert reports, and other medical records to a witness to encourage the witness to rethink
medical conclusions without notice or interference by defense counsel. Similarly, with
the ability to be present at every interview, plaintiff would also gain a considerable
advantage in monitoring and evaluating the trial strategies, mental impressions, and legal
theories of defense counsel. Clearly, it is not in the interests of justice to give one side of
a dispute an advantage that the other does not share. See Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99
F.R.D. 126 (D.D.C. 1983); see generally Daniel P. Jones, Annotation, Discovery: Ex
Parte Interview with Injured Party's Treating Physician, 50 ALR 4th 715 (1986)
(discussion of states that permit or prohibit ex parte interviews). Nor is it appropriate to
allow a privilege to be used in such a manner which has no relation to the purpose for
which is exists. Eli Lilly, 99 F.R.D. at 128-129. A privilege designed to protect patient
information should be limited to that and should not be used to disrupt the balanced
scales of justice. Finally, it is not enough, as the Ethics Committee pointed out, for the
possibility of attorney misconduct to justify a blanket prohibition against ex parte
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contacts, especially since the possibility of ex parte misconduct exists regardless of who
an attorney may represent.
On a more specific note, we would strongly urge the Court not to foreclose the
opportunity for defense counsel to affirmatively seek a qualified protective order to
engage in ex parte interviews with a treating physician under the framework established
and authorized by HIPAA. Pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (1) (ii), a party in a
lawsuit may obtain protected health information by obtaining:
An order of a court or of an administrative tribunal or a stipulation by the
parties to the litigation or administrative proceeding that:
(A)Prohibits the parties from using or disclosing the protected health
information for any purpose other than the litigation or proceeding
for which such information was requested; and
(B) Requires the return to the covered entity or destruction of the
protected health information (including all copies made) at the end
of the litigation or proceeding.
Such an order does not compel the treating physician to disclose information in an ex
parte interview. It merely authorizes it. We believe that there is both utility and
reliability for all parties in this process. As a point of clarification, HIPAA only applies
to covered entities, which consists of health care providers who submit claims and billing
information electronically. 45 CFR 160.102(a).

HIPAA does not provide a private right

of action. 65 FR 82566 (Congress could, but did not, create a private right of action);
Swift v. Lake Park High School Dist 108, 2003 WL 22388878 (N.D. 111. 2003) ("No
federal court reviewing the matter has ever found that Congress intended HIPAA to
create a private right of action.") Instead, a violation of HIPAA is subject to federal
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enforcement and federal sanctions, which can include the imposition of civil and criminal
fines. Ste 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1320-5.
B.

A PHYSICIAN'S DUTY IS TO THE TRUTH

Implicit in the Court of Appeals holding is the notion that a physician has a duty to
assist a patient in litigation in a way that if done for the opposing party, would not only
be a breach of a fiduciary duty of confidentiality, but would also constitute outrageous
conduct for purposes of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Sorensen at ^ 22. It our position that this is an unwarranted and imprudent extension of a
physician's fundamental duty to diagnose and treat a patient and a dangerous precedent in
viewing a physician as something other than a dispassionate and unbiased witness in a
lawsuit.
Unlike an attorney, a treating physician has no direct interest in the outcome of a
lawsuit in which a patient is a party. Whether a patient is in litigation or not, a
physician's interest is in the physical and mental well-being of the patient. To suggest
that it is appropriate for a physician to provide information to a patient's attorney on an
ex parte basis but not afford the same opportunity to opposing counsel, is to subtly but
significantly change the fundamental role of a physician in a lawsuit.
In 1971, the Utah Medical Association and the Utah Bar Association jointly
published the Legal/Medical Interprofessional Code for Utah. See Addendum B. It has
since been updated in 1982 and again in 1993. While the document has no direct legal
significance, it does represent a consensus of both the legal and the medical community
regarding the role and function of a physician witness in litigation.
21
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Among other things, the document discusses the role of a treating physician in
preparing an authorized report upon the request of the parties that details treatment,
causation, pre-existing conditions, prognosis, and the probable cost of future treatment. It
briefly discusses the physician-patient privilege and the impact of an "order, subpoena, or
proper authorization" as an indication of a patient's waiver of the privilege. And it draws
a clear distinction between a treating physician who may be called or deposed by either
party and a retained physician with whom an opposing attorney may not talk or consult
unless permission from the other side has been granted.
Of greatest significance here, however, is the following description of a physician
as a witness:
The physician carries the responsibility of aiding the administration of justice
when called upon to testify in trial. The physician's testimony should be given
without bias and the physician should be unembarrassed by the expectation of a
fee or other reward. The physician must approach the subject in the capacity of a
consultant who makes a diagnosis scientifically and who is unswayed by any
thought other than that of giving a correct opinion in diagnosis. The physician
may be firm in expressing his/her conviction if that is his/her state of mind. On
the other hand, the physician must also remember that he/she is not in the
courtroom as an advocate, and that he/she should not be argumentative or
contentious.
Id. We believe that there is wisdom in limiting a physician's duty in litigation to offering
testimony that is objective, accurate, and truthful and not turning a physician into the
means by which one party in litigation enjoys an advantage over the other or that in any
degree creates an implicit expectation of advocacy.
C. THERE ARE NO SECRETS IN DISCOVERY
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There is nothing that a defense lawyer can find out in an ex parte interview that
cannot be gained through formal discovery. Rule 26(b)(1), Utah R. Civ. P. ("Parties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
partying seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party...."). It is only a
question of whether a defense attorney should be limited to formal discovery and, if so,
whether it would be appropriate to systematically limit all ex parte communications by all
lawyers on all sides.
Our view is that there are no compelling reasons to create additional restrictions
beyond the confines of Rule 506(d)(1), that informal discovery is beneficial to all sides
in litigation, and that court orders can be used to limit informal discovery as the parties
see fit to seek and courts see fit to grant. Otherwise, all parties should be limited to the
same extent.
CONCLUSION
This is a significant case for a number of reasons. We appreciate the opportunity
to share our analysis and thoughts on some of most critical underlying issues. We urge
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the Court to apply Rule 506 as written and expressly reject the policy implications of the
Court of Appeals' decision.
Respectfully submitted this 16 day of January, 2007.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

Chet Loftis
Merrill F. Nelso^
Attorneys for AmteiJ^uriae
and for
David C. Gessel
Attorney for Amici Curiae
UHA, Utah Hospitals and
Health Systems Association
And for
Mark A. Brinton
Attorney for Amici Curaie
Utah Medical Association
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FOREWORD TO FIRST EDITION
Increasingly in recent years, the medical and legal professions have encountered
difficulties arising from the fact that patients with legal problems require the
cooperative effort of physicians and attorneys in the solution of those problems.
Neither profession appeared to understand and appreciate the obligations and
difficulties encountered by the other in these medical-legal settings. Friction
inevitably resulted and misunderstandings mounted.
In early 1970, Dr. J. louis Schricker, Jr., and Dr. John N. Henrie, as President
and President-elect, respectively, of the Salt lake County Medical Society,
determined that the welfare of the patients, the administration of justice and the
relationship between the professions demanded resolution of these problems.
This Interprofessional Code, prepared under their direction, is the culmination of
their efforts and those offices of the Salt lake County Bar Association, who
joined enthusiastically in the project.
After the adoption of the Code by the Salt lake County Medical Society and the
Salt lake County Bar Association, no reason appeared why the benefits of this
Code should not be extended throughout the State of Utah. Accordingly, during
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1971, the Utah State Bar and the Utah State Medical Association considered and
then adopted the Code as applicable to the nearly 3,000 members of the legal
and medical professions of this state.
The Utah State Bar, Utah State Medical Association, Salt Lake County Bar
Association and Salt Lake County Medical Society urge their respective
members to honor the letter and spirit of the Code and to refine and improve it in
the years ahead for the benefit of the professions and the public they serve.
November 23, 1971
FOREWORD TO SECOND EDITION
Since the adoption in 1971, the first edition of the Interprofessional Code has
assisted many members of the legal and medical professions in resolving
difficulties which have arisen in medical-legal settings. However, with the
passage of time and the entry of new members into each profession, the general
level of familiarity with and use of guidelines set forth in the code were found to
have diminished.
In recognition of the worthwhile contribution that a code of procedures and
conducts for interprofessional contact makes toward the efforts of doctors and
attorneys in rendering cooperative public service, the presidents of the Utah
State Bar and the Utah Medical Association appointed representatives of their
respective organizations who have particular interest, background and
experience in medical-legal matters to prepare an updated and revised version of
that Interprofessional Code.
The Interprofessional Committee, as it was called, began work in 1980.
Following the format and content of the excellent product of its predecessors, the
Interprofessional Committee modified some substantive provisions, where
deemed appropriate, to more accurately comply with the dictates of good
practice or the requirements of the law. The Committee also added definitional
and explanatory material to assist doctors and attorneys in understanding and
appreciating each other's roles. An index and table of contents have also been
included so that specific provisions of that work could be more easily accessible
to the busy practitioner.
This second edition of the code has been approved by the vote of the House of
Delegates of the Utah State Medical Association and by vote of the Board of
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar. Members of both medical and legal
professions are urged to honor the letter and spirit of the code.
March 1,1982
FOREWORD TO THE THIRD EDITION
The Utah State Bar has created a Legal-Health Care Committee to deal with
issues relating to interprofessional relationships concerning our clients/patients.
Both physicians representing the Utah Medical Association and attorneys
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representing plaintiffs and defendants in their practices participated in producing
this update.
The Code describes how physicians and attorneys should relate in resolving
issues which involve patient care. It is the sincere hope of this committee that
this Code will be helpful to both professions in their collaborative working
relationships.
February 4, 1993
INTERPROFESSIONAL CODE
INTRODUCTION
The provisions of this Code are intended as guides for physicians and attorneys
in the solution of mutual problems encountered by the two professions in
connection with physical examinations of litigants and the need for medical
testimony. The Code will serve its purpose if it promotes the welfare of patients
and clients, improves the practical working relationship between the two
professions, facilitates the administration of justice and reduces costs and time
demands on all concerned. If you desire to give input regarding this Code or its
application please contact the Legal/Health Care Committee of the Utah State
Bar.

I. MEDICAL EXAMINATION
A. General
1. It is appropriate for a person making a claim for damages for personal
injuries to undergo a medical examination by either a treating or nontreating physician. The purpose of the medical examination is to determine
the nature and extent of the injuries complained of and any resulting
impairment or disability. The examination may also be used to assess the
relationship between the injury, impairment or disability in question and
the incident giving rise to the damage claim.
2. When appointments are made for medical examinations, the physicians set
aside a part of their day for that purpose. It is, therefore, important that
attorneys exert their best efforts to insure that such appointments are kept
or, if this proves to be impossible, that the physician be notified well in
advance so that the time allotted can be devoted to another patient.
3. An attorney arranging for medical examination is responsible to see that
diagnostic data such as x-rays, x-ray interpretations, laboratory reports,
reports of consultation, etc., necessary for the proper performance of such
examination are furnished to the examining physician.
B. Independent Medical Examination
1. In instances where there is a disputed claim for damages for personal
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injury, a medical examination performed by a non-treating physician
("Independent Examination") may be required by agreement between
opposing attorneys, or, if suit has been filed, by a court order.
2. Physicians who are willing to perform an independent medical
examination render a significant service in the interest of justice.
Independent examinations should be undertaken in an impartial manner
and be performed with a degree of thoroughness and attention appropriate
to the circumstances.
3. The physicians who perform an independent medical examination should
communicate their findings and opinions only to the attorney who
arranged the examination. The physician should not disclose findings and
opinions to the patient or to the patient's attorney without the consent of
the attorney who arranged the examination.
C. Scope of Examination
1. The scope of an examination may be limited by the agreement of both
attorneys or by court order. The attorney arranging the examination has an
obligation to notify the physician of any such restriction.
2. Subject to the above limitation, the physicians may take a history and
perform such examinations as may be necessary to formulate an informed
opinion regarding the nature and extent of the person's medical condition.

II. MEDICAL RECORDS
1. An attorney representing a patient is entitled to obtain copies of a
physician's complete chart and notes pertaining to that patient. Upon
proper patient authorization, the physician should promptly provide the
attorney with the patient's complete medical records. The physician is
entitled to reimbursement for the costs of copying records and furnishing
them to the attorney.
2. Attorneys desiring to obtain only a copy of a physician's office records
and not wishing to obtain a narrative medical report from the physician
should so specify in their written request.
3. Production of a physician's office chart and notes (medical records) may
also be required by subpoena. A subpoena may be served on the physician
or on the custodian of the physician's records. If such a subpoena is served
the records must not be delivered or disclosed to the process server. The
subpoena specifies the time and place of delivery of the documents.

III. WRITTEN MEDICAL REPORTS
A. Attorney's Role
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1. The attorney should not expect a physician to make a written report
concerning the condition of the patient or of a party referred to the
physician for an examination, unless the attorney submits to the physician
a letter specifying the type of report required. If a medical report is
requested, the attorney must furnish the physician with a written
authorization signed by the patient and acknowledged before a notary
public.
2. Independent medical examinations are arranged for by agreement between
the attorneys. When an independent examination is to be made pursuant to
such an agreement, or pursuant to a court order, the attorney's written
request for a report should contain specific requests such as:
a. Specify the injuries the party has claimed.
b. Indicate how and when the injury occurred.
c. The request should specify the history the doctor is expected
to obtain, particularly if the patient claims an aggravation of a
pre-existing condition or if previous injury or illness is
suspected or involved.
d. The request should state whether a partial or a complete
examination is desired. It should indicate whether special
studies, such as laboratory work, diagnostic x-rays, or a
consultation, are to be permitted at the physician's discretion.
e. A request for information concerning the physician's specific
diagnosis, treatment (if applicable), and prognosis of the
patient's condition should be made.
f. The physician should be requested to evaluate the patient's
degree of impairment and/or, if given appropriate facts, the
degree of disability. If such a condition is detected, the
physician should assess the extent to which the impairment
and/or disability is temporary or permanent.
g. The physician should be requested to express an opinion
regarding the causal relationship between an alleged accident
and the injury, impairment or disability of the patient.
h. The attorney should ask if the physician believes a reexamination would be necessary in order to testify or make an
informal prognosis.
i. The attorney should reaffirm any previous arrangement
concerning the physician's fees, and should provide other
information needed for billing purposes.
j . If the person examined is a patient of the physician, the
physician should be requested to list the cost of treatment to
date and to estimate the cost of future treatment.
B. Physician's Role
1. Physicians should understand their reports are of critical importance in the
prompt disposition of the patient's claims. Failure of a physician to render
a prompt and thorough report may prevent or delay resolution of a claim.
Physicians should not agree to perform the examination unless they are
to furnish
a prompt
thorough
report.
Neither attorneys nor
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insurance companies can reasonably evaluate the case until a written
report is received from the physician. In some instances, the case cannot
be placed on the trial calendar until receipt and distribution of the
physician's report. There are two types of reports - treating MD and
Independent. Both will be discussed.
i he physician's report should not be made on blank forms where the
spaces are filled in or checked unless specifically directed. Instead, the
physician should make a narrative written report. Medical terminology
should be kept to a minimum and, if necessary, a brief explanation in lay
language should be made. The report should be specific, complete,
concise, and should include the particular medical information requested
by the attorney.
ATTORNEYS: Physicians might appreciate your inclusion of these
specific points in your letter or a copy of this page included with your
request for information.
Authorized reports regarding a physician s own patient should include the
following:
a. How, when and where the accident or injury occurred.
b. Where and when the patient was first seen for this condition
and the extent of the injuries at that time
c. A complete description of the necessary treatment which was
given and its apparent results.
d. A prognosis, if the patient is still under treatment, including
an evaluation of the patient's degree of impairment and/or the
degree of disability. The report should also include a
statement regarding the extent to which such impairment
and/or disability is temporary or permanent.
e. The casual relationship between an accident or other
occurrence and the injury, impairment or disability of llir
patient.
f. If there was a pre-existing disease or injury, its effect on the
present condition and the extent to which the pre-existing
disease or injury was aggravated.
g. The cost of treatment to date and the probable cost of future
treatment,
h. The physician's record should reference all material used in
support of the physician's findings such as repofrts of x-ray
examinations, laboratory reports, reports of consultants, etc.
4

Report by Non-Treating Physician. Where physicians are asked for an
independent examination, their reports should include the following:
a. History of the accident or injury as described by the patient
being examined.
b. The person's account of the treatment received, and its
results. If the person is still under treatment, a descriptiot i
the current treatment should be reported.
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c. A description of the examination of bodily systems, members
or parts injured, with specific attention to abnormalities and
whether x-rays or other consultations are indicated.
d. Comments on the results of the examination including the
extent of injuries, the presence and extent of impairment or
disability and whether the impairment or disability appears to
be permanent or temporary. The physician should also
indicate if a further examination or evaluation will be
necessary to reach a final determination or to prepare for trial
testimony.
e. The casual relationship between the accident or other
occurrence and the patient's injury, impairment or disability.
f. If the history or the examination indicates a pre-existing
disease or injury, the physician should also render an opinion
as to how much was aggravated by the injury under
consideration.
5. In recognition of the importance of medical reports in the prompt
settlement or trial of cases, physicians should furnish requested reports
within two weeks unless extraordinary circumstances require further
delay.
C. Evaluation of Injury
1. Members of the medical and legal professions occasionally use the terms
"impairment" and "disability" interchangeably. The terms, however, have
distinct definitions and should be distinguished.
a. Impairment. Impairment is considered a purely medical condition.
Impairment is any objective or measurable abnormality in physical
or mental function. It is not necessarily an indication of disability
but may be a contributing factor to it.
b. Disability. Disability is not a purely medical condition. Patients are
disabled when their ability to engage in a certain type of activity is
reduced or absent because of impairment or other abnormality.
2. The physician can ordinarily evaluate impairment on the basis of a
medical examination and testing. In order to evaluate a disability,
however, the physician may require information concerning the patient's
work and activities.
3. Either impairment or disability may be temporary or permanent. A
condition is considered permanent when it is stable after reasonable
rehabilitation has been achieved.

IV. SUBPOENAS
A. Duty to Testify
Our system
of justice
requires
theJ.attendance
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any citizen
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at a judicial

proceeding to give testimony regarding the case. Physicians have an obligation
to respond to a subpoena, just as any other citizen, except where grave and lifethreatening emergencies prevent them from doing so. An emergency can never
be a mere matter of convenience to the physician. If physicians ignore
subpoenas, they assume the obligation of convincing the court that the
emergency was genuine and of sufficient gravity to justify their failure to appear.
B. Subpoena Explained
A subpoena is an order of the court commanding a person upon whom it is
served to attend court, or a deposition, at a certain time and place to testify as a
witness in a trial or deposition.
C. Differing Practices Concerning Service of Subpoenas
Many attorneys never subpoena physicians they expect to call as witnesses,
preferring to make personal arrangements with the physicians and relying upon
their promise to appear.
Other Attorneys always subpoena medical witnesses, contending:
1. Unless a subpoena has been served, the court may tefuse to grant a
continuance of the trial if the physician, for any reason, fails to appear;
and
2. It is a typical advantage for the physician to be able to testify, it asked,
that he/she came to court because a subpoena ordered him/her to do so.
1). Recommended Policy
1. A physician should not take offense to being served with a subpoena.
However, the attorneys should inform the physician in advance that a
subpoena will be served. The attorneys should give physicians their best
estimate of the date and time the physician is likely to be called to testify
and should notify the physician as promptly as possible of any change in
the anticipated schedule.
In recognition of the critical demands upon a physician's time, the
attorney should make every effort to avoid unnecessary inconvenience or
delay. Despite such efforts, the physician may not be called to testify as
scheduled. The process of law and the time constraints of other parties
involved in the case should be respected by the physician.
The attorney should make every effort to notify the physician of the time
and place of the trial. As soon as the trial date is certain, attorneys should
immediately notify the physicians of the time of their appearance. The
physician should understand that attorneys sometimes have very short
notice of the precise day and time trial will start and an attorney cannot
predict with certainty the length of testimony to be given by any prior
witness. Mutual understanding of the problems of the two professions and
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a genuine spirit of cooperation is the best guideline for these problem
areas.
4. Fees for physician services are ultimately paid by the patient or client.
Consideration of fair and reasonable charges must be made in order to
control the ultimate costs to the injured party.

V. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Where a physician gives testimony or produces documents under court order,
subpoena or pursuant to proper authorization in a personal injury lawsuit, the
physician is relieved, to the extent specified by such order, subpoena or
authorization, of the usual obligation to keep in confidence the information
concerning the patient/client because the patient has usually waived the right to
prevent disclosure of the information. In the unusual case where this is not true,
the physician will be instructed, at the outset, by the court or by counsel, not to
divulge a confidence, nor disclose such information until authorization by order
of the court.

VI. DEPOSITIONS
(Testimony under oath outside of court)
A. Deposition Explained
A deposition is an official part of court proceedings in which a person, such as a
physician, may be required to give testimony and to be cross-examined under
oath, outside of court, in the presence of an official court reporter and the
attorneys representing the parties. The physician may be required to produce
pertinent medical records at the deposition hearing. The physician may also be
requested to release the records to the court reporter, who, as an officer of the
court, will then duplicate the records and return the original to the physician.
B. Time and Place of Deposition
The time and place of the deposition should be set by agreement with the
physician. Unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary, it should be taken
at the physician's office. Only under unusual circumstances should a deposition
be scheduled during other than regular office hours.
C. Subpoena for Deposition
If the deposition of a physician cannot be set by agreement, his/her attendance
can be required by subpoena. Where the testimony involves the physician's own
patient, it is recommended that, even if the physician agrees to the time and
place of deposition, a subpoena be served upon the physician, requiring the
physician to appear and testify. This will authorize the physician to give
confidential information if requested, and the physician should keep the copy of
the subpoena for his/her future protection.
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Sometimes a subpoena is served on a physician asking for medical records in
lieu of a personal appearance. Upon receipt of a medical records subpoena, the
physician should copy the patient's entire chart, including, but not limited to, the
records, correspondence, billing and all information detailed by the subpoena.
The physician should then mail the records to the attorney requesting the
information. Physicians will be reimbursed for copying charges. Records
generally should not be provided without a subpoena or an authorization signed
by the patient. A Utah statute provides that any time a patient files a medical
malpractice or personal injury action, putting the patient's medical, physical or
psychological condition at issue, the patient-physician privilege is waived. (See
U.C.A. §78-24-8(4)). However, a physician would be prudent to obtain a
subpoena or an authorization signed by the patient before releasing copies of the
patient" records to anyone but the patient.
Attendance at Deposition is a Hardship
Ii it would create a hardship for the physician to appear for a deposition at the
time and place stated in the subpoena, the physician should immediately bring
this fact to the attention of the physician's attorney or to the attention of the
attorneys involved in the case and, in such an instance, the attorneys should
make every effort to avoid hardship by rescheduling the deposition.
Similarly, if an attorney must cancel a scheduled deposition, ample notice should
be given to the physician so the physician can use the vacated time. If the
deposition is canceled with such short notice that the physician cannot
reschedule patients, it is reasonable to discuss the possibility of compensation
for the time lost.
i
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Since the testimony from a deposition may be read at trial, it is important that
the physician, prior to the deposition, prepare carefully. At trial, depositions may
be used to impeach a witness' credibility if trial testimony is inconsistent with
testimony given in a deposition.
Depositions proceed with questions and answers which are transcribed by the
court reporter. It is important to remember to answer truthfully; audibly; to listen
carefully to questions and answer only if you understand the questions; to never
guess or speculate; to not speak when someone else is speaking; and to ask for
clarification whenever you are uncertain. You may refer to your records in
response to questions. Objections may be made by the attorneys present to
"protect the record." Generally, witnesses are required to answer the questions
asked during a deposition even if there are objections made. If a privilege exists
or there is some other legal basis foi an objection other than as to form, your
attorney may instruct not to answer the question and you are entitled to rely on
that instruction. Physicians may not raise legal objections to questions, but
should ask for a break and confer with counsel, if concerned.
F. Scope of Deposition
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A physician may be asked to testify as a fact witness if he/she provided medical
treatment to a party. The physician will be asked for information regarding
his/her education, training and experience; about information concerning the
patient acquired through examinations and testing or through other sources upon
which the physician has relied; and about opinions reached as a part of the
physician's care of the patient including diagnosis, prognosis and the extent of
any impairment and disability. A physician need not offer expert testimony in
the form of opinions and conclusions unrelated to the physician's own care and
treatment of the patient. As a fact witness, physicians are not legally required to
receive more than a statutory witness fee for their deposition testimony;
however, many law firms work with physicians to determine a reasonable
compensation for the time expended.
A physician may also be deposed as an expert witness. An expert witness is
certified by the court to testify as an expert on the issue. As such, the physician
may be asked to state his/her opinions regarding the applicable medical
standards of care and whether they were satisfied or breached. The physician
will have to explain the basis or foundation for his/her criticism or support and
may be asked detailed questions regarding current medical literature and the
patient's medical records. As an expert witness, a physician is entitled to charge
a reasonable amount for his/her preparation time and deposition time.
A physician can be both a fact witness and an expert witness. Generally,
however, physicians prefer to remain neutral and objective if they have treated
the patient as a patient and may feel uncomfortable criticizing either the other
physician involved or the patient.

VII. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND ATTORNEY
1. An attorney representing one side of a disputed personal injury claim
should not attempt to consult with a physician who has been retained or
specially employed by any person on the other side of the disputed claim,
including a physician performing an independent medical examination,
unless the attorneys for both sides agree that he or she may do so.
2. Except as required by the court, a physician who has consulted with or has
been retained or specially employed by an attorney on one side of a
disputed personal injury claim, including a physician performing an
independent medical examination, should not consult with or provide
information concerning the matter to any attorney or person representing
the other side of the disputed claim unless attorneys for both sides agree
that the physician may do so.
3. A physician who has consulted with or has been retained or specially
employed by an attorney on one side of a disputed personal injury claim,
including a physician conducting an independent medical examination,
should not undertake to become a treating physician of the patient without
the consent of the attorney who engaged those services.
4. by
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or specially

employed by an attorney on one side of a disputed personal injury claim,
including a physician conducting an independent medical examination
should keep in mind that the patient ultimately pays for the time or
services for which the physician charges.
A physician who is a treating physician for a patient may be deposed or
called to testify as a fact witness on one side of a disputed personal injury
claim. In these instances, the physician is not being retained or specially
employed as an expert by an attorney, but is being deposed or called to
testify as to his or her first hand knowledge of the patient's care,
treatment, and medical condition.

VIII. CONDUCT OF TRIAL FROM PHYSICIAN'S STANDPOINT]
\ Kolv nl (In IPln «ii i in <l it in i 'iilli
A trial is an adversary proceeding where evidence of the claims of the respective
parties is presented for the purpose of helping the court or jury to decide the
case. Where medical issues are beyond the knowledge of the ordinary layperson,
physicians may be called to give their opinions on such issues. All physicians
called as experts may not agree on a given issue about which they testify. In
cased of disagreement among experts, it is the job of the court or jury to weigh
the respective conflicting testimony and accept or reject such portions of it from
each expert as it chooses. The reason for the court's or jury's acceptance or
rejection of testimony by an expert may never become known or understood. If
the other party challenges the physician's testimom or opinions, the physician
should not take offense,
B. Physician as a Witness
1 The physician carries the responsibility of aiding the administration of
justice when called to testify in a trial. The physician's testimony should
be given without bias and the physician should be unembarrassed by
expectation of a fee or other reward. The physician must approach the
subject in the capacity of a consultant who makes a diagnosis scientifically
and who is unswayed by any thought other than that of giving a correct
opinion in diagnosis. The physician may be firm in expressing his/her
conviction if that is his/her state of mind. On the other hand, the physician
must also remember that he/she is not in the courtroom as an advocate,
and that he/she should not be argumentative or contentious.
•?

The physician should use simple language whenever possible. The
physician should remember that his/her testimony is addressed to
laypersons and not to a medical group. If the physician's testimony does
not help explain and clarify the problems involved, it has not achieved its
purpose. Technical expressions should be followed with simplified
explanations or illustrations.

•

When a physician leels that a "yes" or "no" will not accurately answer a
question, the physician should so state. The court will usually grant
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permission for the physician to qualify or to explain his/her answer.
4. Some physicians are reluctant to express opinions based upon their own
knowledge, experience and observation because other physicians, thought
by them to be better qualified, may hold or have expressed a different
conclusion. Of course, if new facts or other opinions are brought to the
physician's attention which cause the physician to modify his/her opinion,
the witness should not hesitate to express himself/herself accordingly.

IX. PHYSICIAN'S COMPENSATION FOR MEDICAL
EXAMAINATIONS,
REPORTS, COURT APPEARNCES AND DEPOSITIONS
It is impracticable to establish precise rules governing physicians' fees for
medical examinations or reports, depositions and court appearances. It is
important, however, that fees be reasonable, that they be discussed and, to the
extent possible, that they be agreed upon in advance by the physician and the
attorney. In this way, a major cause of misunderstanding and dissatisfaction may
be eliminated. Ultimately, the patient/client bears the burden of paying fees
charged by the physician.
A. Physician's Compensation May Not Be Contingent
Under no circumstances may a physician charge a fee for an examination, or for
the physician's testimony, which is contingent upon the outcome of the lawsuit.
B. Reports to Patient's Attorney
A physician may charge for a report to a patient's attorney where the report is
based upon records which the physician can obtain from the physician's own
office and upon treatment and examinations already made by the physician for
which the physician has received fees or an agreement to pay the physician fee.
If the physician is required to make an additional examination or is required to
obtain or interpret records not in the physician's possession, the physician
should fee free to make an additional charge for the time and professional
services required.
C. Report on Person Referred for Examination Only
Where the attorney requests an examination and report concerning a person who
is not the patient, the physician should either make such a charge as is customary
in the physician's particular field for such examination and report or make a
charge consistent with the amount of time and extent of professional service
involved. The physician's statement of fees should reveal what portion of the
total fee is attributable to charges for x-ray supplies or similar expenses. Again,
the fee arrangement should be discussed with the patient's attorney prior to the
examination.
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D. Expert Witness Compensation
I

Mi attorney should not request a physician to testily on deposition 01 in
court, nor should he subpoena the physician, without making
arrangements for reasonable compensation. While a physician may be
subpoenaed to state facts known to the physician, it is inevitable that a
physician who testifies will be required to formulate and to express expert
opinions, and the physician should not be required to do so without
reasonable compensation.

1

If a physician is called to testify as an expert witness in a case where the
physician has not been the treating physician, the physician should receive
such compensation as is reasonable and customary for similar professional
services in the physician's community and as may have been agreed upon
with the attorney who calls the physician as a witness.
E. Responsibility for Payment of Physician's Charges

An attorney is ethically forbidden to pay debts, medical or otherwise, incurred
by a client except as provided in Rule 1.8(e) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. However, where the attorney contracts for services on behalf of his/her
client's case, the attorney should expect to make payments for the services.
Therefore, while the attorney should not pay for or guarantee payment of
medical services rendered to the client except where obligated by a written
medical lien, the attorney should pay directly for medical reports, conferences
with physicians, time spent in depositions or in court, and look to the attorney's
client for reimbursement of these costs which the attorney has advanced on
behalf of the client.
The physician should bill the patient and not the attorney for medical care
rendered to the patient. The physician should bill the attorney for services
rendered on behalf of the patient at the attorney's request. The attorney should
pay these amounts promptly and as they are billed, and should not wait the
outcome of litigation before paying the same.
Where the attorney is directed by his or her client not to honor, in whole or in
part, an otherwise lawful written lien, an attorney shall either (1) hold in trust
sufficient funds from the proceeds to pay of the lien and expeditiously pay the
same upon receipt of a written authorization executed by the client and the
provider, or (2) interplead sufficient funds to pay of the lien in the event that the
client and provider cannot agree on a settlement amount.
F. What is Reasonable Compensation?
When a physician has been requested to provide services by an attorney, the
physician should charge a "reasonable fee." If the physician has regularly
provided services for a particular attorney, they will likely have evolved an
understanding concerning reasonable compensation. However, in a new
legal/medical relationship, an understanding as to be reasonable compensation
should be promptly established. It is sufficient, for example, for the physician to
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state an hourly charge, a fixed amount, an estimated amount or to identify the
factors that will be taken into account in fixing the amount. When new
developments occur that would render an earlier estimate inaccurate, a revised
estimate should be provided. A written statement concerning the compensation
reduces the possibility of misunderstanding or surprise. Furnishing a simple
memorandum or a copy of the customary fee schedule is sufficient. The
following factors may be considered in determining reasonable compensation:
1. The skill, experience, education, reputation, and ability of the physician
providing the services.
2. The time and labor required.
3. The fee customarily charged in the community for similar services.
4. The loss of income from other sources in providing services.
5. The time limitations imposed.

X. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
A. General
Physicians and attorneys have legal and ethical duties to provide services, to
their patients and clients, in accordance with the standards of care applicable to
their respective professions. If their conduct falls below the applicable standards
of care and causes injury to patients or clients, physicians and attorneys may be
subject to suit for malpractice.
Attorneys representing patients for injuries allegedly received as a result of
medical malpractice are obligated to represent their clients zealously, with the
bounds of the law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such
representation should not be perceived or interpreted by the defendant physicians
as improper, or as motivated by personal animosity or hostility, since such
representation is often necessary to arrive at a fair and equitable resolution of the
matter.
Correspondingly, attorneys have a legal duty and ethical obligation to fairly
evaluate medical malpractice claims against physicians, and to refrain from
prosecuting any action against physicians unless there is either objective
evidence of a breach in the applicable standard of care resulting in injury, or a
legitimate, good faith belief that the care provided fell below the applicable
standard of care.
Even if initially an attorney may have been justified in bringing an action against
a physician, continuation of the action is not justified if it becomes clear, after
pretrial discovery, that the claim of malpractice is not meritorious.
B. Health Care Malpractice Actions in Utah
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Healthcare malpractice actions in Utah are presently governed by the Utah
Healthcare Malpractice Act, the full text of which is found in Title 78, Chapter
14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
The stated legislative purpose for passing the Utah healthcare Malpractice A< I
("The Act") is to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers and to provide procedural changes to expedite early
evaluation and settlement of claims.
The Act sets forth a limitation within which a malpractice action may be
commenced and certain rights may be enforced
The Act also contains a detailed section regarding failure of a physician to obtain
informed consent. (The care provided by a physician is authorized by the patient
after the patient has been fully informed of all material risks associated with a
particular plan of treatment.) The section outlines what proof is required of the
patient, defenses available and who may consent to health care.
The Act requires the Department of Commerce to provide a hearing panel in
alleged medical malpractice cases against physicians. The panel is comprised of
an attorney, a member who is licensed and practicing in the same specialty as the
defendant and a lay panelist. The panel makes a non-binding decision regarding
the merits of the alleged medical malpractice claim.
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